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Simultaneous Hedging of Regulatory
and Accounting CVA
Christoph Berns
Abstract As a consequence of the recent financial crisis, Basel III introduced a new
capital charge, the CVA risk charge to cover the risk of future CVA fluctuations (CVA
volatility). Although Basel III allows for hedging the CVA risk charge, mismatches
between the regulatory (Basel III) and accounting (IFRS) rules lead to the fact that
hedging the CVA risk charge is challenging. The reason is that the hedge instruments
reducing the CVA risk charge cause additional Profit and Loss (P&L) volatility. In
the present article, we propose a solution which optimizes the CVA risk charge and
the P&L volatility from hedging.
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1 Introduction
Counterparty credit risk is the risk that a counterparty in a derivatives transaction
will default prior to expiration of the trade and will therefore not be able to fulfill its
contractual obligations. Before the recent financial crisis many market participants
believed that some counterparties will never fail (“too big to fail”) and therefore
counterparty risk was generally considered as not significant. This view changed
due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis and market
participants realized that even major banks can fail. For that reason, counterparty
risk is nowadays considered to be significant for investment banks. The International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) demand that the fair value of a derivative
incorporates the credit quality of the counterparty. This is achieved by a valuation
adjustment which is commonly referred to as credit valuation adjustment (CVA), see
e.g. [3–5]. The CVA is part of the IFRS P&L, i.e. losses (gains) caused by changes
of the counterparties credit quality reduce (increase) the balance sheet equity.
Basel III requires a capital charge for future changes of the credit quality of
derivatives, i.e. CVA volatility. Banks can either use a standardized approach to
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compute this capital charge or an internal model [2]. The latter charge is commonly
referred to as CVA risk charge. Many banks have implemented a CVA desk in order
to manage actively their CVA risk. CVA desks buy CDS protection on the capital
markets to hedge the counterparty credit risk of uncollateralized derivatives which
have been bought by the ordinary trading desks. Recognizing that banks actively
manage CVA positions, Basel III allows for hedging the CVA risk charge using
credit hedges such as single name CDSs and CDS indexes. However, the recognition
of hedges is different depending on whether the standardized approach or an internal
model is used [2].
Summarizing, we can look at counterparty credit risk from two different perspec-
tives: the regulatory (Basel III) and the accounting (IFRS) one. Depending whether
we consider counterparty risk from a regulatory or accounting perspective, different
valuation methods are applied for this risk. In general, the regulatory treatment of
counterparty risk is more conservative than the accounting one, cf. [6]. The difference
between the regulatory and the accounting treatment of counterparty risk causes the
following problem in hedging the CVA risk charge: eligible hedge instruments such
as CDSs would lead to a reduction of the CVA risk charge. On the other hand, under
IFRS, a CDS is recognized as a derivative and thus accounted at fair value through
profit and loss and therefore introducing further P&L volatility.
The current accounting and regulatory rules expose banks to the situation that
they cannot achieve regulatory capital relief and low P&L volatility simultaneously.
Deutsche Bank, for instance, has largely hedged the CVA risk charge in the first half
of 2013. The hedging strategy that reduced the CVA risk charge has caused large
losses due to additional P&L volatility, cf. [7]. This example illustrates the mismatch
between the regulatory and accounting treatment of CVA.1 The mismatch demands
for a trade-off between these two regimes, cf. [8]. For this reason, we propose in this
article an approach which leads to an optimal allocation between CVA risk charge
reduction and P&L volatility. Our considerations are restricted to the standardized
CVA risk charge.
We start with an explanation of the standardized CVA risk charge, i.e. the reg-
ulatory treatment of CVA. Afterwards, we show that the standardized CVA charge
can be interpreted as a (scaled) volatility/variance of a portfolio of normally distrib-
uted positions. This interpretation reveals the modeling assumptions of the regulator
and will be crucial for the later considerations. In a next step, we explain the coun-
terparty risk modeling from an accounting perspective and we compute the impact
of the hedge instruments (used to reduce the CVA risk charge) to the overall P&L
volatility, assuming that the risk factor returns are normally distributed. Without
the mismatch between the regulatory and the accounting regime, the hedge instru-
ments would move anti-correlated to the corresponding accounting CVAs and the
resulting common volatility would be small. Due to the mismatch, the CVA and the
hedge instrument changes will not offset completely. For this reason we introduce a
1Due to the exclusion of DVA from the Basel III regulatory calculation, the mismatch potentially
intensifies.
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synthetic2 total volatility σsyn consisting basically of the sum of the additional
accounting P&L volatility σhed caused by fair value changes of the hedge instruments
(hedge P&L volatility) and the regulatory CVA volatility σCV A,reg (i.e. basically the
CVA risk charge)3:
σ 2syn = σ 2hed + σ 2CV A,reg. (1)
Hence, (1) defines a steering variable describing the common effects of CVA risk
charge hedging and resulting P&L volatility. One should mention that formula (1)
may suggest statistical independence of the two quantities. However, there exists a
dependence in the following sense: both the regulatory CVA volatility and the hedge
P&L volatility depend on the hedge amount. The more we hedge, the smaller the
σCV A,reg. On the other hand, the more we hedge, the larger the σhed . The definition
of the synthetic volatility as a sum of σ 2hed and σ 2CV A,reg can be motivated by the
following consideration: the term σ 2CV A,reg is related to the regulatory capital demand
for CVA risk. The other term, σ 2hed , can be interpreted as capital demand for market
risk of the hedge instruments. Although the hedge instruments are excluded from the
regulatory capital demand computation for market risk, they potentially reduce the
balance sheet equity and therefore may reduce the available regulatory capital. The
sum in (1) is now motivated by the additivity of the total capital demand.
In the following we will consider σsyn as function of the hedge amount and search
for its minimum. The hedge amount minimizing σsyn leads to the optimal alloca-
tion between CVA risk charge relief and P&L volatility. We will derive analytical
solutions. The discussion of several special cases will provide an intuitive under-
standing of the optimal allocation. For technical reasons we exclude index hedges
in the derivation of the optimal hedge strategy. However, it is easy to generalize the
results to the case where index hedges are allowed.
2 Counterparty Risk from a Regulatory Perspective:
The Standardized CVA Risk Charge
In this section we introduce the standardized CVA risk charge. A detailed explanation
of all involved parameters is given in the Basel III document [2]. The formula for the
standardized CVA risk charge is prescribed by the regulator and is used to determine
the amount of regulatory capital which banks must hold in order to absorb possible
losses caused by future deteriorations of the counterparties credit quality. We will see
that the standardized CVA risk charge can be interpreted as volatility (i.e. standard
deviation) of a normally distributed random variable. More precisely, we will show
that the CVA risk charge can be interpreted as the 99 % quantile of a portfolio of
2We use the word synthetic since σsyn mixes a volatility measured in regulatory terms and a volatility
measured in accounting terms.
3This connection will be explained later.
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positions subject to normally distributed CVA changes (i.e. CVA P&L) only. This
gives some insights into the regulators modeling assumptions for future CVA. It is
worth to mention that the regulators modeling assumptions may hold or not hold. A
detailed look at the regulators modeling assumptions can be found in [6].
In order to be prepared for later computations, we introduce in this section some
notations and recall some facts about normally distributed random variables.
The standardized CVA risk charge K is given by [2]:
K = β√hΦ−1(q) (2)
with
• h = 1, the 1-year time horizon,
• Φ the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
• q = 99 % the confidence level and



















• ωi a weight depending on the rating of the counterparty i, n is the number of
counterparties
• Mi, Mhedi , and Mind the effective maturities for the ith netting set (corresponding
to counterparty i), the hedged instrument for counterparty i and the index hedge
• EADi the discounted regulatory exposure w.r.t. counterparty i
• Bi, Bind the discounted hedge notional amounts invested in the hedge instrument
(CDS) for counterparty i and the index hedge.
Formula (2) is determined by the regulator. In order to get a better understanding
of this formula, we will derive a stochastic interpretation of it. Before that, we need
to recall a fact about normal distributions: if the random vector X has a multivariate
normal distribution, i.e. X ∼ N (0,Σ) with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ , then,





4For simplicity we consider only one index hedge. The results in this article can easily be generalized
to more than one index hedge.
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has a univariate normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ 2 = 〈a,Σa〉. (5)
Now we are able to derive the stochastic interpretation of the CVA risk charge, more
precise the interpretation as volatility.
2.1 Standardized CVA Risk Charge as Volatility
In this section we will show that the regulators’ modeling assumptions behind the
standardized CVA risk charge are given by normally distributed CVA returns which
are aggregated by using a one-factor Gaussian copula model.5 We consider n coun-
terparties. By Ri, we denote the (one year) CVA P&L (i.e. those P&L effects caused
by CVA changes) w.r.t. counterparty i.
Lemma 1 If one assumes Ri ∼ N (0, σ 2i ) and further, if one assumes that the ran-
dom vector6
R = (R1, . . . , Rn)t
is distributed according to a one-factor Gaussian copula model, i.e. R ∼ N (0, Γ )
with Γii = σ 2i and Γij = ρσiσj with ρ independent of i and j for i = j, then the 99 %
quantile of the distribution of R is equal to the CVA risk charge (2).
Proof Using (4) and (5), we find that the aggregated CVA return (common CVA
P&L) RCV A,reg := ∑ni=1 Ri = 〈1, R〉7 has the distribution N (0, σ 2CV A,reg) with














If we compare the above expression with (3), we see that this expression is equal to
β2 (with Bind = 0, i.e. no index hedges) if we set ρ = 0.25 and σi = ωi(MiEADi −
Mhedi Bi). The quantile interpretation of the CVA risk charge (i.e. Formula (2)) follows
from standard properties of the normal distribution.
The above lemma shows that the standardized CVA risk charge is basically the
volatility of the sum
∑
i Ri of n normally distributed random variables. The normally
distributed random variables are equicorrelated: ρ(Ri, Rj) = 0.25. Each CVA return
Ri has the volatility
σi = ωi(MiEADi − Mhedi Bi). (7)
5This is a very strong assumption that might not be true in reality.
6By ·t we denote the transpose of a vector/matrix.
7By 1 we denote the vector (1, . . . , 1)t .
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Hence, buying credit protection on counterparty i reduces the corresponding CVA
volatility. If we assume Mi = Mhedi , the optimal hedge w.r.t. counterparty i is given
by a CDS with notional amount Bi equals
Bi = EADi. (8)
3 Counterparty Risk from an Accounting Perspective
As explained in the introduction, counterparty risk from an accounting perspective is
quantified by a fair value adjustment called credit valuation adjustment (CVA). The
CVA reduces the present value (PV) of a derivatives portfolio in order to incorporate
counterparty risk:
PV = PVriskfree − CV A,
whereby PVriskfree denotes the market value of the portfolio without counterparty risk
and CVA is the adjustment to reflect counterparty risk. For the modeling of CVA,
banks have some degrees of freedom. Typically, the accounting CVA is computed





with T the effective maturity of the derivatives portfolio, D(t) the risk-free discount
curve, EE(t) = E[max{0, PV (t)}] the (risk-neutral) expected positive exposure at
(future time point) t, and dP(t) is the (risk-neutral) default probability of the coun-
terparty in the infinitesimal interval [t, t + dt]. For the implementation of (9), a
discretization of the integral is necessary. Many banks assume a constant EE profile
(i.e. EE(t) = EE∗ for all t). In that case, (9) simplifies to




Further, the (risk-neutral) default probabilities are typically modeled by a hazard
rate model, i.e. one assumes that the default time is exponentially distributed with
parameter λ. Using this assumption, we can write:




The approximation (11) will be helpful in the next section, where we describe the
hedging of CVA from an accounting perspective
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3.1 CVA Hedging from an Accounting Perspective
In previous sections we have seen that the regulatory CVA hedging (i.e. CVA risk
charge hedging) can be achieved by buying credit protection. Effectively, (7) says
that the regulatory exposure is reduced by the notional amount of the bought credit
protection. At this place, we describe CVA hedging from an accounting perspective.
Let us consider a derivatives portfolio with a single counterparty. In order to hedge
the corresponding counterparty risk, one can buy, for example, a single name CDS
such that the CVA w.r.t. the counterparty together with the CDS is Delta neutral
(i.e. up to first order, CVA movements are neutralized by the CDS movements). The
condition for Delta neutrality is
ΔCV A = ΔCDS (12)
whereby Δ describes the derivative of the CVA and CDS respectively (w.r.t. the
credit spread of the counterparty). To be more precise, the default leg of the CDS
should compensate the CVA movements. Using a standard valuation model for a
CDS (see e.g. [4]) and computing the derivatives in (12), it is easy to see that (12) is
equivalent to
B = EE∗, (13)
i.e. the optimal hedge amount is given by EE∗. Typically, EE∗ is given by the average






If we compare (13) with (8) we see that the optimal hedge notional amount for hedging
CVA risk from a regulatory perspective is the regulatory exposure EAD, while the
optimal hedge notional amount for hedging accounting CVA risk is given by EE∗. In
general it holds EAD > EE∗, due to conservative assumptions made by the regulator8
(we refer to [6] for a detailed comparison of these two quantities). Thus, hedging CVA
risk differs whether it is considered from an accounting or a regulatory perspective.
This mismatch causes additional P&L volatility in the accounting framework, if the
CVA risk is hedged from a regulatory perspective (i.e. if the CVA risk charge is
hedged).
Finally we remark that we can write the CVA sensitivities ΔCV A = dds CV A as
ΔCV A = EE∗ΔCDS, (15)
whereby ΔCDS is the sensitivity of (the default leg of) a CDS with notional amount
B = 1.
8For example, the alpha multiplier in the IMM context overstates the EAD by a factor of 1.4. Further,
the non-decreasing constraint to the exposure profile leads to an overstatement, see [6] for details.
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4 Portfolio P&L
As explained above, the hedge instruments reduce the (regulatory) counterparty credit
risk. But they may cause new market risk due to additional P&L volatility. However,
although in accordance with Basel III eligible hedge instruments are excluded from
market risk RWA calculations, the additional P&L volatility of the hedge instruments
leads to fluctuations in reported equity. In order to describe the effects of hedging to
the overall P&L, we introduce in the present section the corresponding framework.
We divide the overall P&L in different parts: the P&L of the hedge instruments, the
P&L of the remaining positions, and the CVA P&L. The framework will be helpful
later on, when we want to quantify the impact of the CVA risk charge hedges to the
accounting P&L.
4.1 Portfolio P&L Without CVA
Let us assume that a bank holds derivatives with n different counterparties for which
single name CDS exists. The bank has to decide to which extent it hedges the coun-
terparty risk w.r.t. these counterparties by either single name CDS or index hedges.
By Σ we denote the correlation matrix (of dimension N × N , N > n) of all risk
factors ri, i = 1, . . . , N the banks (trading) portfolio is exposed to. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the correlations between the CDS of the considered n coun-
terparties are given by the first n × n components of Σ , i.e. Σi,j = ρ(CDSi, CDSj),
i, j = 1, . . . , n. Further, Σn+1,i denotes the correlation between the index hedge and
the CDS on counterparty i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The whole portfolio Π of the bank contains
the hedge instruments (CDS and index hedge) as well as other instruments (e.g.
bonds): Π = Πhed ∪ Πrest . The sub-portfolio Πhed is driven by the credit spreads of
the counterparties. Note that Πrest may depend on some of these credit spreads as








whereby Δi denotes the sensitivity of CDSi w.r.t. the corresponding credit spread,
Δi,rest denotes the sensitivity of the remaining positions which are sensitive w.r.t. the
credit spread of counterparty i as well,9 Bi (resp. Bind) denotes the notional of CDSi
(resp. the notional of the index hedge), and dri describes the change of the risk factor
ri (the first n risk factors are the credit spreads) in the considered time period.
9For example, if Πrest contains a bond emitted by the counterparty i, then (ignoring the Bond-CDS
Basis) Δi,rest = −Δi).
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4.2 Impact with CVA
This section extends the above considerations to the case where we allow for a CVA
component. We define the total P&L as the difference between the P&L given by
(16) and the CVA P&L:
P&Ltot = P&L − P&LCV A, (17)





In (18), the risk factors ri are the same risk factors which appear in the first n + 1
summands of (16). This is because the CVAs are driven by the same risk factors as
the corresponding hedge instruments. Recall that in a setup where counterparty risk
is completely hedged, the P&L of the hedge instruments is canceled out by the P&L
of the CVAs. This is the case, if the corresponding sensitivity is equal. In Sect. 3.1
we have shown how one can achieve this (using the condition of Delta neutrality) by
choosing the right hedge notional amounts.
4.3 Impact of CVA Risk Charge Hedging on the Accounting
P&L Volatility
The additional P&L volatility caused by the hedge instruments is basically given by
the residual volatility of the hedge instruments which is not canceled by the CVAs.
In order to derive an expression for this volatility, we start with the derivation of the
volatility of the total portfolio P&L. The residual volatility will consist of those parts
of the total volatility which are sensitive w.r.t. the hedge instruments.
In order to proceed, we have to introduce the following notations: the vec-
tor ΔCV A ∈ Rn+1 contains the CVA sensitivities and the return vector dr ∈ RN
describes the changes of the N risk factors the trading book is exposed to. We
further introduce the sensitivity vectors11 Δ = (Δ1, . . . , Δind, . . . , ΔN )t ∈ RN
10We consider only the credit spreads as risk factors. Exposure movements due to changes in market
risk factors are not considered. This is unproblematic for the considerations in this article since we
will end up with dynamic CVA hedging strategy (cf. Sect. 5) which incorporates the exposure
changes.
11The first n components of Δ are the CDS sensitivities w.r.t. credit spread changes and the n + 1th
component is the sensitivity of the index hedge.
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and12 Δrest = (Δ1,rest, . . . , Δn,rest)t ∈ Rn, the notional vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn, Bind)t ∈
R
n+1 and the diagonal matrix QΔ = diag(Δ1, . . . , Δn,Δind) ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1).
Lemma 2 If we assume that the portfolio P&L is given by (17) and if we further
assume dr ∼ N (0,Σ) (for some correlation matrix Σ), then the squared volatility


















































Proof With the above defined vectors, we can write:















= 〈a − b + c, dr〉 (20)
whereby drn+1 denotes the n + 1-dimensional vector consisting of the first n + 1
components of dr, drN−n−1 consists of the remaining N − n − 1 components of dr,ΔN−n−1 denotes the vector of the remaining N − n − 1 sensitivities, and 0N−n−1 is
the N − n − 1-dimensional vector whose components are all equal to 0.14 Clearly,
the vectors a, b and c coincide with the respective summands of the left hand side of
the scalar product in (20). If we use dr ∼ N (0,Σ), it follows from (4) to (5):
σ 2P&Ltot = 〈a − b + c,Σ
(a − b + c)〉
= 〈a,Σa〉 + 〈b,Σb〉 + 〈c,Σc〉 − 2〈a,Σb〉 + 2〈a,Σc〉 − 2〈c,Σb〉. (21)
If we plug in the expressions for a, b and c, we obtain (19). 
In order to be prepared for later computations, we will further simplify Expression
(19). To this end, we introduce the following notations: by Σn+1 we denote the
(n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix consisting of the first n + 1 column and row entires of
Σ only, i.e. Σi,j, i, j = 1, . . . n + 1. The matrix ΣN,n+1 is the N × (n + 1) matrix
12The vector Δrest contains the n sensitivities w.r.t. credit spread changes of those trading book
positions which are different from the CDSs used for hedging but are sensitive w.r.t. to the credit
spreads of the hedge instruments as well.
13The vector ΔN−n−1 is defined in the proof.
14In the following, we will omit the index N − n − 1 and simply write 0.
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obtained from Σ by deleting the last N − n − 1 columns and Σ tN,n+1 denotes its
transpose matrix. With this notation and using that 0 cancels many components in
(19), we can write:























In (22), the first summand describes the volatility of the hedge instruments if they are
considered as isolated from the remaining positions (i.e. those positions which are
different from the hedge instruments). Analogously, the other quadratic terms (i.e.
the second and the last summand in (22)) represent the volatility of the CVA and the
remaining positions respectively. The cross terms (third, fourth, and fifth summand)
describe the interactions between the volatility of the hedge instruments, the CVA
and the remaining positions. For example, the third term describes the interaction
between the CVA and the hedge instruments.
The P&L volatility σ 2hed caused by the hedge instruments is given by those terms
of (22) which depend on the hedge instruments, i.e. those terms which depend on B.
These are the first, the third, and the fourth term of (22), i.e.








The other terms of (22) describe the volatility caused by the remaining positions.
In order to simplify the notation, we write σ 2hed in the following way:
σ 2hed = 〈AB, B〉 + 〈B, b〉 (24)
with
A = QΔΣn+1QΔ (25)
and




− QΔΣn+1 ΔCV A. (26)
Note that σ 2hed is not simply given by a quadratic form but also incorporates a linear
part. The quadratic form describes the volatility of a portfolio consisting of the hedge
instruments, while the linear part describes the correlations of the hedge instruments
with the remaining positions and with the CVAs.
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4.3.1 Definition of the Steering Variable
We now define a steering variable aiming to define a unified framework for CVA
risk charge hedging and P&L volatility. The steering variable is given by a synthetic
volatility consisting of the sum of the regulatory CVA volatility and the volatility of
the accounting P&L caused by the hedge instruments:
σ 2syn = σ 2CV A,reg + σ 2hed . (27)
The synthetic volatility unifies both the regulatory and the accounting framework.
It can be considered as a function of the hedge notional amounts. The minimum
of σ 2tot,syn describes the optimal allocation between CVA risk charge reduction and
P&L volatility. Note that σ 2tot,syn contains now the matrices Γ and Σ , who describe
the correlations between the same risk factors. This mismatch can be resolved, if
the advanced CVA risk charge is used [2]. However, the use of different CVA sen-
sitivities cannot be resolved. The most significant differences arise due to different
exposure definitions: while the exposures EADi contained in the regulatory CVA
sensitivities are based on the effective EPE and multiplied by the alpha multiplier
(for IMM banks), this is not the case for the exposures used to compute the account-
ing CVA sensitivities. In general, these mismatches will lead to smaller accounting
CVA sensitivities. Thus, a complete hedging of the CVA risk charge leads to an
overhedged accounting CVA. See [6] for a complete description of the sources of the
mismatch. Another source of potential overhedging is the following: if accounting
CVA is already hedged by instruments which are not eligible hedge instruments in
the sense of Basel III, additional hedge instruments are necessary for the hedging
of the CVA risk charge. These hedge instruments will cause additional P&L volatil-
ity, since their offsetting counterparts (i.e. the CVAs) are not present (since they are
already hedged).
5 Determination of the Optimal Hedge Strategy
This section describes concretely how the mismatch between the regulatory regime
and the accounting regime can be mitigated. The result will be a dynamic CVA hedg-
ing strategy based on an optimization principle of the steering variable introduced
in the previous section. We will ignore index hedges but all results can easily be
generalized to the case where index hedges are included.
As opposed to the previous sections, the vector B will not contain the compo-
nent Bind in this section. As explained before, we want to minimize the synthetic
volatility15
σ 2syn(
B) = σ 2hed(B) + σ 2CV A(B) (28)
15We ignore the index tot.
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as a function of B. The component B∗i of the minimum B∗ describes the optimal
notional amounts of CDSi, used to hedge the counterparty risk w.r.t. counterparty i.
We now determine B∗ by computing the zeros of the first derivative of σ 2syn.
Theorem 1 Under the same assumptions as in Lemma 2, the minimum B∗ of (28) is
given by16
B∗ = H−1f (29)
with
H := 2(A + QMhed Γ QMhed ) (30)
and
f := 2QMhed Γ QM−−→EAD − b. (31)
Proof In order to keep the display of the computations clear, we introduce the
diagonal matrices QM := diag(ω1M1, . . . , ωnMn) and QMhed := diag(ω1Mhed1 , . . . ,
ωnMhedn ) and the n-dimensional vector
−−→
EAD whose components are given by the
counterparty exposures. Using these definitions, we can write:
σ 2CV A = 〈QM
−−→
EAD − QMhed B, Γ (QM−−→EAD − QMhed B)〉. (32)
whereby Γ describes the constant correlation between the CVAs (all diagonal ele-





B, B〉 + 〈b, B〉)
+ ∂
∂ B 〈QMhed




= 2AB + b + 2QMhed Γ QMhed B − 2QMhed Γ QM−−→EAD
= H B − f , (33)
where we have used the notations (30) and (31). This shows (29). Further, we note
that the matrix H is derived from correlation matrices and therefore positive semi-
definite. As a result, H is indeed invertible. Moreover, it holds
∂2σ 2syn
∂2 B = H.
Hence, the second derivative of σ 2syn is positive semi-definite and B∗ is indeed a
minimum.
16All terms are introduced in the proof.
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Remark The implementation of the optimal hedge strategy works as follows: one
has to compute on a regular basis (e.g. daily, weekly, etc.) the optimal solution (29).
To do this one needs the CVA sensitivities,17 the trading book sensitivities, and the
correlation matrix of the risk factors.18 Afterwards, the CVA desk needs to buy credit
protection described by the optimal solution. This reduces the capital demand for
counterparty risk and (by construction) minimizes the accounting P&L of the bought
credit protection.
The approach presented in this article is based on many simplifying assumptions
and restricted to the standardized CVA risk charge. Obviously, one could relax these
assumptions and apply a comparable optimization principle. In such a case, it would
possibly be hard to derive an analytical solution. Instead, one would obtain a numer-
ical solution.
5.1 Special Cases
For illustration purposes, we consider the case n = 1, i.e. the special case of a single
netting set. In that case both H and f are scalars:
H = 2Δ2Σ1,1 + 2ω2(Mhed)2
and








whereby Δ describes the sensitivity of the hedge instrument of the considered coun-
terparty, Δrest the sensitivity of the remaining positions (i.e. all positions without the
CDS used for hedging purposes), ΔCV A the sensitivity of accounting CVA and Δj
are the sensitivities to the risk factors of the remaining positions. Thus, the optimal
solution is
B∗ =
2ω2MMhedEAD + 2σ 2ΔΔCV A −
(
Δσ 2Δrest + Δ∑Nj=2 Σ1,jΔj
)
2Δ2σ 2 + 2ω2(Mhed)2 (35)
where we have used that Σ1,1 is equal to the volatility σ 2 of the hedge instrument.
First, in order to get a better understanding of B∗, let us assume that the risk factor
(credit spread) of the hedge instrument is independent of the remaining positions, i.e.
17Banks which actively manage their CVA risk usually compute these sensitivities.
18Larger banks usually have these data available, e.g. for market risk management purposes.
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Δrest = 0 and Σ1,j = 0, for j = 2, . . . , N . In that case (35) (we assume additionally
M = Mhed) becomes
B∗ = 2ω
2M2EAD + 2ΔΔCV Aσ 2
2ω2M2 + 2Δ2σ 2 . (36)
We see already that B∗ is (at least from a certain volatility level) a decreasing function
in σ 2, as we would expect it. Obviously, if we ignore the fact that the hedge instrument
introduces further volatility (i.e. we assume σ 2 = 0), it holds
B∗ = EAD.
It is easy to see that this is the optimal hedge amount if we minimize the CVA risk
charge alone. As explained above, the most significant differences between the IFRS
CVA and the regulatory CVA are the different exposure computation methodologies.
In (36), these differences are reflected in EAD and ΔCV A: while EAD is based on
the regulatory methodology, ΔCV A is based on accounting CVA methodology.19
For illustration purposes, let us assume that ΔCV A is based on the same exposure
methodology as the regulatory CVA sensitivities (and that the modeling assumptions
Sect. 3 holds). This means, that cf. (15)
ΔCV A = EADΔ, (37)
i.e. we use the regulatory exposure EAD in (15) instead of the economical exposure
EE∗. If we plug in (37) in (36), we obtain:
B∗ = (2ω
2M2 + 2Δ2σ 2)EAD
2ω2M2 + 2Δ2σ 2 = EAD. (38)
Thus, if we ignore the mismatch between the accounting and the regulatory CVA,
the optimal hedge solution is given by the optimal hedge solution of the CVA risk
charge only. If we include the mismatch, we can approximate the accounting CVA
sensitivity by (cf. (15))
ΔCV A = EE∗Δ. (39)
As explained in Sect. 4.3.1, EE∗ is smaller than EAD. Using (36) and (39) yields:
B∗ = 2ω
2M2EAD + 2Δσ 2EE∗
2ω2M2 + 2Δ2σ 2 <
2ω2M2EAD + 2Δσ 2EAD
2ω2M2 + 2Δ2σ 2 = EAD. (40)
Hence, the mismatch leads to a smaller optimal hedge amount than the current reg-
ulatory exposure.
19Note that ΔCV A depends on the exposure as well (while Δ is based on a unit exposure, cf.
(16)). But this exposure is computed based on accounting methodology. This is the main source of
differences between the accounting and regulatory regimes.
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We remark that it cannot be excluded that B∗ becomes negative. This is the case
if the risk factors of the remaining positions are strongly correlated to the risk factor
of the hedge instrument. In such a situation it seems to be reasonable to set B∗ = 0.
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